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This paper examines how higher education a⁄ects job and marital sat-
isfaction. We build up a model with assortative matching where individu-
als decide whether to attend university both for obtaining job satisfaction
and for increasing the probability to be matched with an educated partner.
The theoretical results suggest that, as assortative matching increases, the
number of educated individuals increases, their job satisfaction falls while
their marital satisfaction increases. We test our model using the British
Household Panel Survey data for the years 2003-2006. Our empirical
￿ndings support the theoretical results.
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11 Introduction
This paper examines how educational decisions in￿ uence job and marital satis-
faction. We build up a theoretical model to highlight the relationship between
higher education, job and marital satisfaction, and then we test the model
empirically.
Our idea is that acquiring higher education has two main e⁄ects in an
individual￿ s life. First, it gives several advantages at work: a better kind of
job, a better salary, more bargaining power in the job market, and so on.
All these advantages are expressed by a greater job satisfaction. Second, it
increases the chances of marrying an educated partner, as the educational
levels of partners are strongly interrelated.
Why do partners tend to have similar educational levels? This may be ex-
plained by lifestyle choices: similar-educated partners are more likely to share
professional duties, past time activities and view of life. Also, the ￿fertility
intentions￿are similar between partners with similarities in education: edu-
cated individuals prefer to delay conception relative to the general population
(Cochrane, 1979). In contrast, large di⁄erences in the partners￿educational
level have negative e⁄ects on experienced life satisfaction (Frey and Slutzer,
2006). We refer to the similarity in partner￿ s educational levels as ￿assorta-
tive matching￿ 1. Past research has shown strong evidence of increases in the
educational resemblance of spouses since at least the 1940s in United States
(Kalmijn 1991a, 1991b; Mare 1991; Pencavel 1998; Qian and Preston 1993;
Smits et al. 2000, Schwartz and Mare, 2005).
We examine two populations, one of men and one of women. In each popu-
lation, the members di⁄er in ability and decide whether to attend university or
not. To attend university gives job satisfaction in the working life, which can
be positive or negative according to ability. Afterwards men and women are
matched in marriage. We assume that individuals prefer to marry a partner
who attended university, as they generally have a better income to share, a
higher social status, a more interesting conversation and so on. The matching
can be random or assortative. Random matching takes place when partners
meet each other by chance. Thus the partners￿levels of education are unrelated
to one another. Assortative matching occurs if an individual meets the partner
1The expression ￿assortative matching￿has been coined by Gary Becker (1973), and it
alludes to a relationship (either positive or negative) between characteristics of partners.
Here we refer to the similarity in level of education between partners.
2at the university, or in any situation where the educational level in￿ uences the
chance of a meeting. In this case the partners￿education is positively related.
Whether matching is assortative depends on the institutions and tradition of
a society: for example, the more the educational system requires that students
spend time together, the more likely the matching will be assortative.
The theoretical results show that, as the probability of assortative matching
increases, university attendance increases, the expected marital satisfaction
increases and the marginal and average job satisfaction decrease. The intuition
behind these results is the following: as assortative matching increases, the
probability of marrying a partner with the same level of education increases.
Educated persons are preferred as partners since they give positive marital
satisfaction. As a consequence, individuals might decide to attend university
even if their job satisfaction will be negative, since this can be o⁄set by the
increased probability of marrying an educated partner.
To test the theoretical model, we use the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) and we consider a subsample of couples from years 2003-2006. We
consider education as a binary measure telling us whether or not an individ-
ual attended university. To verify the existence of assortative matching, we
check for a positive relationship in the level of education between partners.
Then, we test for a relationship between the individuals￿job satisfaction and
higher education. Finally, we examine the relationship between marital sat-
isfaction and partner￿ s higher education, to control whether in the presence
of assortative matching, individuals obtain a higher marital satisfaction from
an educated partner. The empirical ￿ndings are consistent with the theoreti-
cal results, although their signi￿cance changes according to gender and is not
always strong.
This paper is related to three di⁄erent branches of the literature, namely
the literature on pre-marital investments, the literature on job satisfaction and
the literature on marital satisfaction. In the former2, pre-marital investments
in human capital in￿ uence the kind of matching in the marriage market, the
decision power inside the family or the presence of assortative matching. Fol-
lowing this literature, we assume that a link exists between education, marriage
and assortative matching.
The paper is also related to the job satisfaction literature, and in partic-
ular to the strand that investigates relationships between job satisfaction and
2To cite some important contributes, Peters and Siow, 2001, Iyigun and Walsh, 2007,
Chiappori et al., 2006.
3education3. Meng (1990) ￿nds that education increases workers￿freedom to
decide how to do the work, workers￿in￿ uence on the decisions of supervisors,
and their content with the physical environment of the job. Idson (1990) re-
ports no signi￿cant e⁄ects of education in job satisfaction. Clark (1996) shows
that individuals with longer schooling have comparative lower levels of job
satisfaction, as do men, middle-aged people, those working longer hours, and
employees in larger establishments. Clark and Oswald (1996) ￿nd that the
overall job satisfaction is declining in the level of education when income is
held constant, and that satisfaction depends inversely on workers￿comparison
wage rates. Most recently, Florit and Vila-Lladosa (2007) show that the ef-
fects of education on job satisfaction are mainly indirect e⁄ects transmitted
though the in￿ uence of schooling on workers￿health status, wages and other
observable job characteristics. Our potential contribution to this literature is
to propose a theoretical framework to interpret the relationship between job
satisfaction and education.
Finally, the paper is related to the marital satisfaction literature. Here the
levels of education between partners are usually considered as control variables
(e.g., Rogers and May, 1990, Glenn, 1990; White and Rogers, 2000). There
are a number of studies suggesting that the quality of marital relationships
is positively associated with partners￿education (some examples are Stanley
et al., 2006, Hahlweg and Markman, 1988, Halford et al., 2003, Sayers et al.,
1998 Silliman et al., 2001). This paper can contribute to this literature by
providing both further evidence to the positive relationship between marital
satisfaction and the partner￿ s level of education and a theoretical explanation
to it.
The paper is organised as follows. The theoretical model is developed in
Section 2; the analysis of equilibrium is illustrated in Section 3; Section 4
describes the data and the variables used; the empirical model is presented in
Section 5; our results are summarised in Section 6, and concluding remarks
are in the last section.
3Previous studies analysed job satisfaction related to training (Jones et al., 2009), tem-
porary jobs (Booth, Francesconi, Frank, 2002), unionisations (Bryson, Cappellari, Lucifora,
2004) and work environment (Gazioglu and Tansel, 2006).
42 Theoretical model
We study an economy with two populations, equally large, one of men and
one of women. The members of each population di⁄er in ability, labeled
￿i 2 [0;1];i = m (men);w (women), respectively, and distributed with same
density f(￿i) and c.d.f. F(￿i). In our model, ability is higher the lower ￿i.
We consider a single generation where men and women decide whether to
attend university or to work immediately. We refer to individuals who acquired
higher education as ￿educated￿individuals. The proportions of educated men
and women are denoted as ￿m;￿w 2 [0;1], respectively.
We assume that in the job market, a non-educated individual obtains a
bene￿t normalised to zero while an educated individuals will receive an educa-
tional bene￿t yi > 0, since to attend university is generally necessary to gain
access to better paid, less tiring or more sophisticated jobs. The educational
bene￿t yi can be seen as a better salary as well as an improvement in work
conditions, the quality of job, hours worked, and so on. Also, we assume that
the men￿ s educational bene￿t is higher than the women￿ s, ym > yw. This
hypothesis re￿ ects the empirical evidence that, ceteris paribus, women gener-
ally face worse job conditions than men4. Educated individuals have a utility
cost of education c￿i, where c > 0. This represents the fact that more able
individuals make less e⁄ort in attending university.
We de￿ne job satisfaction as the educational bene￿t net to the cost of
education, yi ￿ c￿i. We assume that c > ym, therefore individuals with low
ability can have negative job satisfaction by attending university so that they
prefer to go to work immediately. Our de￿nition of job satisfaction is related
to the job type and the necessary education to obtain it. In other words, it
is the advantages of a graduate job net to the e⁄ort of acquiring a graduate
degree. For simplicity, we abstract away from working conditions (i.e., distance
between home and job, relationship with colleagues and so on).
After the education decision, every individual marries one of the opposite
sex. We assume that to marry an educated partner gives marital satisfaction
4For example, Burchell et al. (2007) shows some evidence of it for European countries
in the period 1990-2005. There is a peristent gender inequality in many aspects of working
conditions. In particular women are under-represented in senior positions, are more likely to
have part-time jobs, their health is most a⁄ected by their work. Women are also less likely to
be the main earner in the home because they tend to be segregated into the lower-paid jobs.
In addition, the gender pay gap provides an economic rationale which reinforces women￿ s
position as the primary person responsible for the home and care responsibilities.
5b > 0. This occurs since a partner bene￿ts from a more educated partner,
because of a better income to share, a more interesting conversation, more
open-mindedness and so on.
Given the bene￿ts and costs for attending university and the marital sat-




educated ym ￿ c￿m + b;yw ￿ c￿w + b ym ￿ c￿m;b
not educated b;yw ￿ c￿w 0;0
2.1 The matching
The expected payo⁄ of individuals depends on the marriage matching. This
can be random or assortative.
Random matching happens anytime a meeting takes place by chance. In
this case, the partners￿level of education is completely unrelated. Hence the
probability for a man to marry an educated woman is ￿w (i.e., the probabil-
ity that a woman is educated) and the probability for a woman to marry an
educated man is ￿m (i.e., the probability that a man is educated), regardless
of the individuals￿level of education. Assortative matching occurs when an
individual meets the partner at university or in any situation where the edu-
cational level in￿ uences the chance of a meeting: in this case we assume that
partners have the same education with probability one.
We denote the probability of assortative matching as ￿ 2 [0;1]. This is
exogenously determined by the educational system of a certain society. For
example, the more the students are required to spend time together at univer-
sity, the higher the probability of assortative matching5. Another example is
the role of school tracking, that is the separation of pupils by academic ability
into groups for all subjects within a school (Gamoran, 1992). An educational
system that postpones school tracking keeps a more heterogeneous group of
pupils together for a long time, by decreasing the probability of assortative
matching6.
5Blossfeld and Timm (2003) analyse the relationship between educational system and
marital assortative matching in many western countries. Their results show that the more
time individuals spend at school, the greater the chance of marrying a partner with similar
education (i.e., the higher ￿).
6Holmlund (2007) studies the e⁄ects of a school reform on marital assortative matching.
She examines an educational reform, implemented in Sweden in the 1950s and 60s, which
6In order to determine the matching mechanism we need to make some
hypothesis on the proportion of educated individuals. The di⁄erent role in
society and family of men and women makes us think that to assume di⁄erences
in educational decisions according to sex is consistent to the real world. In
particular we study the case where there is a larger number of educated men
than educated women7, i.e., ￿m > ￿w. To assume more educated men than
women8 is consistent with the previous assumption ym > yw, which makes
think that, ceteris paribus, more men will attend university than women.
According to the case ￿m > ￿w, with assortative matching educated men
marry an educated woman with probability ￿w
￿m and every educated woman
￿nds an educated partner. On the other hand, none of the uneducated men
marries an educated woman, while some uneducated women will marry an
educated man. Given the assumption on the matching types and ￿m > ￿w,
the matching mechanism is the following:
Men￿ s matching Probability
edu man + edu woman (1 ￿ ￿)￿w + ￿ ￿w
￿m
edu man +unedu woman 1 ￿
h
(1 ￿ ￿)￿w + ￿ ￿w
￿m
i
unedu man + edu woman (1 ￿ ￿)￿w
unedu man + unedu woman 1 ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)￿w]
Women￿ s matching Probability
edu woman + edu man (1 ￿ ￿)￿m + ￿
edu woman +unedu man 1 ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)￿m + ￿]





unedu woman + unedu man 1 ￿
h





postponed tracking and extended compulsory education from seven to nine years. Her results
show that this might have resulted in a reduction in assortative matching.
7Note that the choice of focusing on this case does not imply that there is no symmetric
equilibrium or an asymmetric equilibrium where the number of educated women is higher
than the number of educated men. Obviously the matching mechanism changes according
to which equilibrium we want to examine.
8In reality, the gap in schooling between men and women is narrowing down. Goldin et
al., 2006 show that, in many developed countries, women now have more schooling than men.
Of the 17 OECD countries with su¢ cient data, they document that university enrollment
rates of women were below those of men in 13 countries in the 1980s, but by 2002, women
university enrollment rates exceeded those of men in 15 countries. However, our empirical
analysis is based on a sample of individuals who attended higher education along the past
50 years, where the gap between men and women in higher education was straightforward in
favour of men.
73 Analysis of equilibrium
The equilibrium of the interaction in educational decisions between men and
women occurs when no individual wants to change his or her choice of ed-
ucation. This is represented by the pair of abilities where individuals are
indi⁄erent between studying or not: we de￿ne this as (￿￿
w;￿￿
m).
Educated individuals have ability below ￿￿
i (note that ability is higher the
lower ￿i), so the value of ￿￿
i increases as their number increases. As a conse-
quence, ￿￿
i is equal to the probability to be educated, i.e., ￿w = F(￿￿
w) and
￿m = F(￿￿
m). Without loss of generality, we assume F = ￿i, so we can rewrite
the equilibrium solutions ￿w = ￿￿
w and ￿m = ￿￿
m.
Given the payo⁄ matrix, the matching mechanism and the assumptions
on the distribution of ability, men and women decide to attend university if
their expected payo⁄ of studying is higher than the expected payo⁄ of going
to work. This is shown by the following lemma.





















￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
wb;
while a woman attends university if and only if:
((1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
m + ￿)(yw + b)+
(1 ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)￿￿




































E￿(non ￿ ed:man) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
wb;
8respectively, where the ￿rst part of both equations represents the expected
payo⁄of marrying an educated woman and the second part of the ￿rst equation
is the expected payo⁄ of marrying a non-educated woman. The expected
payo⁄s for women are:
E￿(ed:woman) = ((1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
m + ￿)(yw + b)+
(1 ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
m + ￿))yw ￿ c￿w;
and












respectively, where ￿rst part of both equations represents the expected payo⁄
of marrying an educated man and the second part of the ￿rst equation is
the expected payo⁄ of marrying a non-educated man. Men and women will
prefer to study until the expected payo⁄ of attending university is higher than
expected payo⁄ of going to work at once:
E￿(ed:man) ￿ E￿(non ￿ ed:man);
and
E￿(ed:woman) ￿ E￿(non ￿ ed:woman);
which gives the lemma.
The following proposition shows the equilibrium in educational choices.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium in educational choices exists and it is given by
the pair (￿￿
m;￿￿














Following that ￿m > ￿w, we need to verify that ￿￿
m > ￿￿
w: in other words,
a woman who is indi⁄erent between studying or not is more able than a man
who is indi⁄erent between studying or not. This is shown by the following
corollary.





w are probabilities, they need to be higher than
zero. If ￿￿
m > 0, then (1 ￿ ￿￿
w)(yw ￿ c￿￿
w) + b￿ ￿ 0, and hence if yw ￿ c￿￿
w.
9If ￿￿
w > 0, then ￿￿
m (c￿￿
m ￿ ym) > 0. This holds only if ym < c￿￿
m. Given that
ym > yw, we have c￿￿




To interpret Proposition 1, we need to analyse the e⁄ects of a variation in
assortative matching. To do that, we study the comparative statics through
a computational example of equilibrium. The parameters values are chosen
in such a way that the following assumptions hold: ￿￿
m, ￿￿
w 2 [0;1], and c >
ym > yw. In particular, we assign the following values: educational bene￿t,
ym = 0:2;yw = 0:15, marital satisfaction, b = 0:4, cost of education c = 1.
We consider the e⁄ects of the presence of assortative matching on mar-
ginal and average job satisfaction and on expected marital satisfaction. The
marginal job satisfaction (i.e., the job satisfaction of the individual being indif-
ferent between studying or not) is ym ￿c￿￿
m for men and yw ￿c￿￿
w for women.
The average job satisfaction is denoted as ￿jsi and is obtained by assuming
a uniform distribution, ￿jsi =
yi￿c￿ ￿i+yi￿c￿￿
i
2 , where ￿ ￿i is the highest level of




The expected marital satisfaction is denoted by E(b)i and depends on the
probability of an educated individual to marry an educated partner. According









b for educated men and
E(b)w = ((1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
m + ￿)b for educated women.
Table 1 illustrates the results. As assortative matching increases, both
marginal and average job satisfaction diminish. Moreover, while the marginal
job satisfaction is always negative, the average satisfaction becomes negative
for high probabilities of assortative matching. On the other hand, the ex-
pected marital satisfaction increases the higher the probability of assortative
matching.
These results may be explained in the following way. As assortative match-
ing increases, the probability of marrying a partner with the same level of ed-
ucation increases. Educated persons are preferred as partners since they give
positive marital satisfaction. As a consequence, individuals might decide to
attend university even if their job satisfaction is negative, as this can be o⁄set
by the increased probability of marrying an educated partner.
4 The data
The dataset used in our analysis is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
This is a nationally representative random sample survey of households in
Britain, which began in 1991. The BHPS was designed as an annual survey of
10Table 1: computational example of equilibrium
Parameters ym=0.2, yw=0.15,c=1, b=0.4
Assortative matching β 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Men's marginal ability θm 0.232 0.304 0.378 0.453 0.526
Women's marginal ability θw 0.188 0.263 0.338 0.409 0.476
Marginal men -0.032 -0.104 -0.178 -0.253 -0.326
job satisfaction women -0.038 -0.113 -0.188 -0.259 -0.326
Average men 0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.06
job satisfaction women 0.06 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09
Expected marital men 0.100 0.178 0.246 0.302 0.345
satisfaction women 0.124 0.205 0.276 0.334 0.381
each adult (16+) member of a sample of more than 5,000 households, making
a total of approximately 10,000 individual interviews. The same individuals
are interviewed in successive waves and, if they leave from original households,
all adult members of their new households will also be interviewed.
Unlike the previous contributions to the job satisfaction literature, which
focus on cross-sectional analysis9, we consider a four-years sample for 2003-
2006, including 5406 couples (10812 individuals) of men and women aged be-
tween 23 and 65 years who provided complete information at the interview
dates, who are married or in a relationship and live in the same household.
These restrictions have two e⁄ects. First, they guarantee that the individ-
uals in the sample considered are at a working age. This is necessary in order
to obtain information for job satisfaction. Second, they allow us to highlight
the relationship between the educational choices of individuals in a couple.
Nonetheless the choice of a sample of couples may raise concerns about self-
selection and marital satisfaction, since individuals who live in a couple may
achieve more satisfaction by being in a relationship than the ones that prefer
to remain single.
9To the best of our knowledge, Meng (1990) uses the Social Change in Canada Survey
for 1981; Isdon (1990) analyses the Quality of Employment Survey for 1977; Blanch￿ ower
and Oswald (1992) consider the National Children Development Survey; Clark and Oswald
(1996) and Clark (1996) examine the BHPS for 1991; ￿nally, Florit and Lladosa (2007) study
the Spanish Household Survey for 1998.
114.1 Dependent variables
We consider higher education, job satisfaction and marital satisfaction as de-
pendent variables. A positive relationship between higher education and the
partner￿ s higher education would indicate a high probability of assortative
matching. The BHPS asks individuals which educational degree they obtained.
We construct a binary variable taking the value of the unity if individuals have
obtained any degree higher than college (A-level) and zero otherwise.
According to the theoretical results, a high probability of assortative match-
ing has two e⁄ects. First, job satisfaction diminishes as the probability of
obtaining higher education increases.
The BHPS asks to rate the job satisfaction levels with four items: ￿pay￿ ,
￿job security￿ , ￿kind of work￿and ￿hours worked￿ . Each of these was to be
given by the worker a number from 1 to 7, where 1 corresponded to ￿not sat-
is￿ed at all￿ , 7 corresponded to ￿completely satis￿ed￿ . Individuals were then
asked a ￿nal question, after they had rated their levels of contentment with the
list of topics, worded as: ￿All things considered, how satis￿ed or dissatis￿ed
are you with your present job overall using the same 1-7 scale?￿ . The way the
question was asked suggests that individuals￿replies weigh up many attributes
of the job package10. Hence the data may approximate total well-being from
work rather better than can a narrow question about job satisfaction. Also, in
this choice we follow Clark and Oswald (1996).
The second e⁄ect of a high probability of assortative matching is that mar-
ital satisfaction increases as the probability that the partner obtains higher
education increases. The BHPS asks individuals the following question:￿How
dissatis￿ed or satis￿ed are you with your husband/wife/partner?￿ . Respon-
dents could answer on a scale from one (totally unsatis￿ed) and seven (very
satis￿ed). For some values, like 1 or 2, we have an amount of answers which
is lower than 1%. Hence we regroup it by creating a new variable: if marital
satisfaction is 1, 2 or 3, we assign the value zero (￿unsatis￿ed￿ ), if marital
satisfaction is 4, we assign the value one (￿neutral￿ ) and ￿nally if it is 5, 6 or
7 we assign the value two (￿satis￿ed￿ ).
10To control that, we performed the analysis of job satisfaction with the speci￿c indicators:
these ￿ndings con￿rms this statement. Upon request these analyses can be provided.
124.2 Explanatory variables
As explanatory variables, we consider a speci￿c explanatory variable for each
dependent variable, and then a number of control variables for every dependent
variable. For the analysis of assortative matching and marital satisfaction,
the explanatory variable is the partner￿ s higher education, while for the job
satisfaction analysis, the explanatory variable is higher education.
The control variables are sex, age, age squared, regions, and professions.
The variable sex takes values of zero for men and one for women.
As regions we consider ￿ve macro areas: Northern England, Middle Eng-
land, Southern England, Scotland and Wales. For each of them we create a
dummy variable. We exclude from the analysis individuals from North Ire-
land, for the strong segregation in marriages between Catholics and between
Protestants in this area (Jerkins, 1997), which causes distortions in the analysis
of assortative matching.
Finally, we sort individuals according to their job. We use ￿ve main job
quali￿cations, derived by the Standard Occupational Classi￿cation 2000 (SOC
2000): professional, manager, administrative, technician and manual. For
every quali￿cation, we create a dummy variable.
4.3 Descriptive analysis
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the full sample, men and women.
The mean for job satisfaction is 5.34 for the full sample, 5.21 for men and 5.48
for women. If women had, on average, a higher job satisfaction than men,
since in the theoretical model we assumed ym > yw and ￿m > ￿w, necessarily
we would expect that the number of educated women is lower than the number
of men (that is, educated women are in average abler than educated men, by
which they obtain a higher job satisfaction). Indeed the amount of men who
acquire higher education is approximately 5% higher.
The mean marital satisfaction is 1.89 for the full sample, 1.90 for men and
1.88 women. The average age around 42 years for men and 40 for women.
The most part of couples (around 26%) are from South England and the least
part comes from the Midlands (around 12%). Manual jobs are the most com-
mon for both genders, followed for men by management and for women by
administrative jobs.
Finally, in Table 3 we compare job and marital satisfaction to life overall
satisfaction, so to examine their relative value. If an individual rates job or
13Table 2. Descriptive statistics: full sample, men and women.
Full sample Men Women
Variable Mean Std. Dev. MinMax Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max
Job satisfaction 5.34 1.22 17 5.21 1.24 1 7 5.48 1.19 1 7
(not at all=1, complete=7)
Marital satisfaction 1.89 0.39 02 1.9 0.37 0 2 1.88 0.41 0 2
Age 41.37 10.01 23 65 42.2 10.09 23 65 40.54 9.86 23 65
Regions
Wales 0.16 0.37 01 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1
Scotland 0.2 0.4 01 0.2 0.4 0 1 0.2 0.4 0 1
Southern E ngland 0.26 0.44 01 0.26 0.44 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1
Middle E ngland 0.12 0.33 01 0.12 0.33 0 1 0.12 0.33 0 1
Northern E ngland 0.21 0.41 01 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.21 0.41 0 1
Professions
Manager 0.16 0.36 01 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.1 0.3 0 1
Professional 0.12 0.33 01 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.12 0.32 0 1
T echnician 0.15 0.36 01 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.16 0.36 0 1
Administrative 0.14 0.35 01 0.05 0.23 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
Manual 0.41 0.49 01 0.45 0.49 0 1 0.37 0.48 0 1
Higher Education 0.59 0.49 01 0.61 0.48 0 1 0.57 0.49 0 1
(Yes=1, No=0)
Observations 10812 5406 5406
14marital satisfaction with a high value but this is lower to the rating of life
overall satisfaction, then job/marital satisfaction are relatively low although
their absolute value is high. According to Table 3, the correlation between
job/marital satisfaction and life overall satisfaction is quite low.
Table 3. Correlation between life overall satisfaction, job and marital satisfaction.
Variable Life overall satisfaction Job satisfaction Marital satisfaction
Life overall satisfaction 1.00
Job satisfaction 0.47 1.00
Marital satisfaction 0.31 0.06 1.00
5 The Empirical Model
In this section we present the empirical speci￿cation. In order to test the
implication of the theoretical model, ￿rst we need to verify the presence of
assortative matching through a positive relationship between partners￿edu-
cation11. If assortative matching were present, according to our theoretical
results, we expect a negative relationship between job satisfaction and higher
education, as more low-ability individuals attend university, by diminishing
the average job satisfaction. At the same time, we expect a positive relation-
ship between marital satisfaction and the partner￿ s higher education. Indeed
this explains why some individuals attend university although this will give
them a negative job satisfaction. Therefore we estimate an equation for job
satisfaction and an equation for marital satisfaction, in order to verify these
implications. The equation of assortative matching is:
uniit = ￿1sexit + ￿2ageit + ￿3age2it + ￿4regionsit + ￿5unipit + "it; (2)
where i = 1;::;n denote individuals and t = 1;2;3;4 the ages considered, uniit
represents higher education, sexit;ageit and age2it denote sex, age and age
11The literature on assortative matching focuses on trends in the positive relationship
between education level of partners through time (see Schwartz and Mare, 2005, for a dis-
cussion). Instead we just check for the existence of a positive relationship in the partners￿
education to prove the correctness of our assumption.
15square, regionsit collects the control variables about regions and unipit is the
partner￿ s level of education. We perform a binary random-e⁄ects probit model
(Guilkey and Murphy, 1993), which assumes unobserved heterogeneity to be
constant over time. An alternative empirical strategy such as the ￿xed-e⁄ects
probit model is hampered by both a very low time variation and the almost
exclusive presence of binary explanatory variables.
Second, we estimate an equation for job satisfaction:
jobsatit = ￿1sexit + ￿2ageit + ￿3age2it + ￿4regionsit+ (3)
+ ￿5professionsit + ￿6uniit + "it;
where jobsatit is job satisfaction and professionsit is a vector of the control
variables about job quali￿cation. Because the ordered nature of job satis-
faction scores in most surveys, the typical estimation technique performed is
ordered probit estimation12. Nonetheless, the panel nature of the data im-
pedes performance at an ordered analysis13. We sidestep the issue by keeping
the ordered nature of the job satisfaction scores and perform a pooled ordered
probit. This allow us to take into account that job satisfaction can change for
the same individuals.
Finally, we investigate the relationship between marital satisfaction and
the partner￿ s level of education:
maritalsatit = ￿1sexit + ￿2ageit + ￿3age2it + ￿4regionsit+ (4)
+ ￿5professionsit + ￿6unipit + "it;
where maritalsatit is marital satisfaction. Even in this case we perform
a pooled ordered probit analysis. We take into account heteroskedasticity
through robust standard errors in both job and marital satisfaction analysis.
One may argue that education can be potentially endogenous. However,
this aspect is not investigated in both literatures of job and marital satisfaction.
Irrespective of it, we did not control for endogeneity of education due to the
absence of valid instruments in our data14. Another concern may refer to
12Most studies make use of ordered probit estimation but Florit and Lladosa (2007), whose
work actually criticises the use of ordered choice models and compares this analysis with a
Structural Equation Model (SEM).
13A cross-sectional ordered probit analysis has been performed by considering years 2003,
2004, 2005, and 2006: the results are qualitative similar to the panel results. Upon request,
we can provide these ￿ndings.
14Only for 2003, BHPS has parents￿education, number of syblings and school type as
16the fact that job and marital satisfaction are not necessarily simultaneously
determined. Nevertheless, this identi￿cation would have been incorrect. By
the theoretical model, we expect that on average job satisfaction is negatively
related to education and marital satisfaction is positively related to partner￿ s
education. But it is not necessarily true that an educated individual needs to
have negative job satisfaction and positive marital satisfaction. For example,
for a very able individual these may both be positive.
6 Results
Table 4 shows the results of assortative matching for random e⁄ects probit
model. The relationship between ages and higher education is increasing but
concave. This information is probably distorted by self-selection, since the
sample is formed only by spouses or live-in partners. Indeed young individuals
who are married or live with the partner usually do not attend university, as
they could not bear the expenses. The region of living is not relevant. There is
a positive and signi￿cant relationship between the partners￿levels of education
indicating the presence of assortative matching.
The ￿rst part of Table 5 presents the results for job satisfaction. The
dummy variables omitted are: (i) for region, ￿Southern England￿and (ii) for
professions, ￿Manual￿ .
Job satisfaction is positively related to age and negatively related to age
square. This is signi￿cant for the full sample and men but not for women.
This result is in line with the previous evidence with British data (Clark,
1996). This result can be explained in the following way. As the job years go
by, generally the working skills, the wage and the responsibility increase, and a
more important role is acquired. All these aspects make working more ful￿lling.
On the other hand, as individuals grew old, they become more and more tired
of working, by increasingly o⁄setting the bene￿ts of a more experienced job.
Workers in Wales are more satis￿ed with their jobs, as are male workers
in Middle England and Scotland. A possible explanation can be that, in rel-
atively poorer regions, the presence of unemployment, lower income and less
potential instrumental variables candidates. However, the introduction of these variables
reduces greatly the number of observations. An alternative instrument might be the period
of the year when an individual is born. However, this is a valid instrument for compulsory
school, while there is no evidence of seasonal patterns in education in colleges and graduate
school competition rates (Angrist and Krueger, 1991).
17Table 4. Assortative matching. Random-effects probit
Variable Full Sample
Sex  -0.546 ***
(Man=0,Woman=1) (0.184)
Age  0.359 ***
(0.070)
Age squared  -0.004 ***
(0.001)
Regions (dummy variable omitted: Southern England)
Wales -0.317
(0.288)




Northern E ngland 0.084
(0.24)






Notes: The dependent variable is the individual's  higher education (1=yes, 0=no).
Values of standard errors are presented in parenthesis. Significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and * respectively.
18Table 5. Results: pooled ordered probit with robust estimators
Job satisfaction Marital satisfaction Table 4. Job satisfaction: pooled ordered probit with robust estimators
Variable Full sample Men Women Full sample Men Women
Sex 0.284 *** n/a n/a  -0.119 *** n/a n/a
(Man=0,Woman=1)  (0.021)  ( 0.037)
Age -0.031 *** -0.055 *** -0.009  -0.064 ***  -0.043 **  -0.085 ***
 (0.008) (0.012) ( 0.012)  (0.015) (0.022) ( 0.021)
Age squared  0.001 ***  0.001 ***  0.001  0.001 ***  0.001 ***  0.001 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Regions (dummy variable omitted: Southern England)
Wales 0.109 ***  0.168 ***  0.054  0.148 ***  0.312 ***  0.005
(0.032)  (0.045) (0.046) (0.056)   (0.085) (0.076)
Middle E ngland  0.026  0.064 **  -0.002  0.012  0.073  -0.049
( 0.034) (0.046) (0.050) ( 0.058) (0.082) (0.081)
Scotland  0.017  0.073 *  -0.034  0.190 ***  0.252 ***  0.129 *
(0.029) (0.041) ( 0.041) (0.052) (0.076) ( 0.073)
Northern E ngland  -0.030  0.016  -0.069 *  0.121 **  0.309 ***  -0.038
( 0.029) (0.041) (0.041) ( 0.050) (0.076) (0.068)
Professions (dummy variable omitted: manual)
Professional  0.041  0.128 ***  -0.055  0.188 ***  0.063  0.314 ***
(0.033) ( 0.046) ( 0.049) (0.062) ( 0.085) ( 0.090)
Manager  0.051 *  0.151 ***  -0.102 **  0.086  0.105  0.056
(0.030) ( 0.038) ( 0.050) (0.053) ( 0.070) ( 0.084)
T echnician  0.053 *  0.122 ***  -0.017  0.094 *  0.079  0.118
(0.031) (0.045) ( 0.044) (0.055) (0.084) ( 0.074)
Administrative  -0.060 *  0.002  -0.123 ***  0.088  0.052  0.110 *
(0.032) (0.064) (0.039) (0.056) ( 0.122) (0.064)
Education  -0.069 ***  -0.040  -0.091 *** - - -
(No=0,Yes=1) (0.022) (0.031) (0.033) - - -
Partner's education - - -  0.078 **  0.122 **  0.041
(No=0,Yes=1) - - - (0.037) (0.055) (0.051)
Log Pseudo-likelihood -15354.69 -7933.64 -7377.963 -3323.659 -1524.598 -1787.582
Wald chi2 226.17 55.87 41.33 59.86 34.99 39.63
(Prob>chi2) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 10812 5406 5406 10812 5406 5406
Notes: The dependent variables are job and marital satisfaction. Values of standard errors are presented in parenthesis.
Significance at the 1%, 5% and  10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and * respectively.
19job opportunities makes the individuals￿job expectations to be lower. Hence,
ceteris paribus, the same job is more appreciated in a poor rather than a rich
area.
Also, workers are relatively more satis￿ed by working as managers or tech-
nicians. Male workers are more satis￿ed if they do professional jobs, while
female workers are relatively more satis￿ed with manual jobs. An interpreta-
tion could be that women, apart from working, generally deal with household
tasks and look after children. A manual job generally is less stressful and it
might help to manage better all these duties.
Educated workers, both men and women, are relatively less satis￿ed. This
is signi￿cant for the entire sample and women, but not for men. According to
the theoretical model, the interpretation of lower job satisfaction for educated
individuals is the following: given the presence of assortative matching, some
individual will attend university even if he or she will obtain a negative job
satisfaction. This is optimal if the expected marital satisfaction increases by
attending university.
In the literature of job satisfaction, Blanch￿ ower and Oswald (1992) analyse
the National Children Development Study (NCDS) for 1981. Unlike our re-
sults, their ￿ndings show a positive relationship between job satisfaction and
higher education. Meng (1990) estimates disaggregated job satisfaction for
1981 in the Social Change in Canada Survey (SCCS). He ￿nds signi￿cance for
a negative relationships between higher education and ￿payment￿and ￿sur-
round￿ (i.e., job environment), and a positive relationship between higher edu-
cation and ￿free￿and ￿in￿ uence￿ . Idson performs his analysis with the Qual-
ity of Employment Survey (QES), which considers US data for 1977. He did
not ￿nd any signi￿cant relationship between education and job satisfaction.
Finally, Florit and Lladosa (2007), by the Spanish Household Survey Panel
(SHPS) for 1998, ￿nds a positive relationship between job satisfaction and
education.
The results on marital satisfaction are reported in the second part of Table
5. The dummy variables omitted are the same used in the job satisfaction
analysis. The region with lower marital satisfaction is Southern England. A
possible interpretation can be the higher cost of life in Southern England and
London, and a more stressful lifestyle which has recoils on the couple￿ s life.
Any worker enjoys higher marital satisfaction compared to manual workers,
even though this is signi￿cant only for professional women. The reason can be
that a non-manual worker might feel professionally more accomplished. This
20can re￿ ect positively in the couple￿ s life.
There is a positive relationship between marital satisfaction and the part-
ners￿levels of education of the full sample, men and women, even though this
is not signi￿cant for women. This is in line with the previous evidence in
the literature of marital satisfaction (some examples are Stanley et al., 2006,
Hahlweg and Markman, 1988, Halford et al., 2003, Sayers et al., 1998, Silli-
man et al., 2001). These results on marital satisfaction are consistent with
the ￿ndings of the theoretical model, and thus they may explain why some
individuals attend university even though they are going to obtain a negative
job satisfaction.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper examines the impact of higher education in marital and job sat-
isfaction. As assortative matching increases the proportion of both educated
men and women increases. This makes both marginal and average job sat-
isfaction fall and marital satisfaction increase. The empirical test with the
British Household Panel Survey for years 2003-2006 con￿rm the existence of
assortative matching. Job satisfaction diminishes the higher the educational
quali￿cation, while marital satisfaction increases the higher the partner￿ s level
of education, as expected by the theoretical model.
One critique to our approach can be that we do not take divorce into
account. This can be relevant only if we assume a grade of relationship between
the level of education and the probability of being divorced. In the case that
there is no correlation or the probability of being divorced is negatively related
to the amount of education, the ￿divorce e⁄ect￿can be normalised to zero.
Indeed in this case the assumption of positive marital satisfaction given by an
educated partner still holds. On the contrary, in the case that the probability
of being divorced is positively related to the amount of education, our analysis
holds as long as the expected marital satisfaction (net of the negative increased
expected divorce) is positive.
Some other informations, such as parents￿job and education, ethnic and
income di⁄erences, would have added more insights to the analysis. However,
the price to pay was to reduce greatly the number of observations caused by
the lack of data along the survey. Future work could investigate whether these
theoretical ￿ndings are con￿rmed in datasets from other countries.
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